

WiP: Towards Formal Specification of Attestation Frameworks for Confidential Computing

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
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
Outline

- 1 Background
- 2 Proposal
- 3 Summary

Network Security: TLS



Endpoint Security: Remote Attestation for CC





Single-Stepping and Instruction Counting Attacks against Intel TDX

TDXdown presents two attacks on TDX's single-stepping countermeasure and uses them to recover ECDSA keys via a new weakness in nonce generation of OpenSSL and wolfSSL.

Outline


1 Background

2 Proposal

- System Architecture-Level Specification
- Network Protocol-Level Specification


3 Summary

Proposed Generic Architecture




- Stages i and ii are **unspecified** for all solutions!


Design Options



Design Options



Design Space for Attested TLS



(Typical) Comparison/Tradeoffs

Property	Pre-handshake	Intra-handshake	Post-handshake
Modification	TA/CA	TLS	Application
Replay protection	×	✓	Possible
Impact on connection establishment latency	Medium ($t_{hs} + t_a$)	High ($t_{hs} + t_g + t_a$)	Low (t_{hs})
Effective connection establishment latency	Low	Low	High ($\geq 0.5RTT$)

- t_{hs} = Time for TLS handshake (without attestation)
- t_g = Time for generation of evidence
- t_a = Time for appraisal of evidence
- WiP
 - Usability/Ease of use
 - Complexity of implementation/formal verification
- **Discussion:** any other property?

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- Open Questions

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- Open Questions
 - How to efficiently and automatically verify underspecified systems?
 - How to discover missing specs automatically?